In 15 , we give a type system that guarantees that well-typed multi-threaded programs are possibilistically noninterfering. If thread scheduling is probabilistic, however, then well-typed p r ograms may have probabilistic timing channels. We describe how they can be eliminated without making the type system more r estrictive. We show that well-typed c oncurrent programs are p r obabilistically noninterfering if every total command with a high guard executes atomically. The proof uses the concept of a probabilistic state of a computation, following the work of Kozen 10 . 1
Introduction
This work is motivated by applications of mobile code where programs are downloaded, as needed, and executed on a trusted host examples include web browsers and e-commerce applications for smartcards and set-top boxes. Here a host may have sensitive data that downloaded code may need, and we w ant assurance that they are not leaked by the code. In some cases, the best approach m a y simply be to forbid any access to the sensitive data, using some access control mechanism. But often the code will legitimately need to access the data in order to function. In this case, we need to ensure that it is not leaked by the code.
Speci cally, this paper is concerned with identifying conditions under which concurrent programs can be proved free of probabilistic timing channels. Previous work has centered around developing a type system for which one can prove that well-typed multi-threaded programs have a possibilistic noninterference property 15 . The proof relies on a purely nondeterministic thread-scheduling semantics. But although the property rules out certainty in deducing private data, its practical utility is somewhat questionable. The trouble is that thread scheduling is usually probabilistic in real implementations, and in this case it is easy to construct well-typed programs with probabilistic timing channels. Here we show h o w to rule out such c hannels without making the type system more restrictive.
The basic idea
Consider a simple imperative language with threads where each thread is a sequence of commands and threads are scheduled nondeterministically. A thread may access a shared memory through variables which are classi ed as low public, or high private. We want to ensure that concurrent programs cannot copy the contents of high variables to low v ariables.
Now suppose x is a high variable whose value is either 0 or 1, y is a low v ariable and c is some command that takes many steps to complete. Then consider the following program:
Thread : But suppose the two threads are scheduled by ipping a coin. Then the threads run at roughly the same rate and the value of x ends up being copied into y with high probability. So there is probabilistic interference when thread scheduling obeys a probability distribution, even when the program is well typed. A c hange in the initial value of x changes the probability distribution of nal values of y.
One obvious way to treat the program is through the type system. We might adopt the severe restriction that guards of conditionals be low. In this case, the example is rejected because it is no longer well typed. Another approach is to require that the conditional be executed asynchronously 8 . But there are cases where you want a conditional to execute synchronously.
Another strategy is to extend the language in some way that allows one to use high guards in conditionals, provided a certain machine-checkable condition is satis ed. This is the approach w e take. In fact, the condition we impose is very simple. We require that conditionals with high guards be executed atomically. This is accomplished by wrapping the conditional with a new command, called protect 14 , that guarantees the conditional will be executed atomically in a multithreaded environment. We will show that such welltyped programs satisfy a probabilistic noninterference property, which s a ys that the probability distribution of the nal values of low v ariables is independent of the initial values of high variables. In general, the property requires that any total command with a high guard must be protected. These commands include primitive recursion and other forms of guarded statements found in programming languages.
Syntax and semantics
Threads are expressed in a simple imperative language: phrases p ::= e j c expressions e ::= x j n j e 1 + e 2 j e 1 , e 2 j e 1 = e 2 commands c ::= x := e j c 1 ; c 2 j if e then c 1 else c 2 j while e do c j protect c Metavariable x ranges over identi ers and n over integer literals. Integers are the only values; we use 0 for false and nonzero for true. Note that expressions do not have side e ects, nor do they contain partial operations like division.
We de ne a small-step transition semantics for individual threads in Figure 1 . We assume that expressions are evaluated atomically. 2 Thus we simply extend a memory in the obvious way to map expressions to integers, writing e to denote the value of expression e in memory . These rules de ne a transition relation s ,! on con gurations. A con guration is either a pair c; or simply a memory . In the rst case, c is the command yet to be executed; in the second case, the command has terminated, yielding nal memory .
At most one thread can be in a protected section at any time. We capture this property by appealing to a standard natural semantics for commands in the hypothesis of rule atomicity, written here as `c 0 .
The hypothesis means that command c evaluates completely to a memory 0 from a memory . This is the trick for expressing the atomicity of command execution that allows for a simple noninterference proof. Our natural semantics is standard and is described in 17 . Further, we assume that protected sections are not nested. This is a reasonable assumption since protected sections are transparent in a sequential language, which is what the natural semantics treats. Thus we avoid having to introduce a rule for protect into the natural semantics. Finally, w e assume that no while command occurs in a protected section. The reason for this is to simplify our probabilistic semantics. With protect, execution of a thread may block: protect while true do skip One needs to compute the probability of a thread being selected from among the unblocked threads only. By prohibiting the potential for nontermination in a protected section, we are guaranteed that all threads in a thread pool are unblocked in that each can make a transition under s ,!. Thus, the probability of a thread being selected from a thread pool O can be determined simply from the size of the pool jOj.
As in 15 , we take a concurrent program to be a set O of commands that run concurrently. The set O is called the thread pool and it does not grow during execution. We represent O as a mapping from thread identi ers , , . . . to commands. In addition, there is a single global memory , shared by all threads, that maps identi ers to integers. Threads communicate via the shared memory. We call a pair O;, a global con guration. Execution of a concurrent program takes place under a xed probability distribution for the scheduling of threads; our semantics prescribes a uniform distribution for simplicity. The execution is This asserts that the probability of going from O; to O 0 ; 0 i s p. The rst two global rules in Figure 1 specify the global transitions that can be made by a thread pool. The third global rule is introduced to accommodate our notion of a probabilistic state. As we shall see, it ensures that probabilities of a state sum to 1. With these global rules, we can represent a concurrent program as a discrete Markov c hain 3 . The states of the Markov chain are global con gurations and the stochastic matrix is determined by g ,! p .
The type system
Here are the types used by our type system: data types ::= L j H phrase types ::= j var j cmd For simplicity, w e limit the security classes here to just L and H; it is possible to generalize to an arbitrary partial order of security classes.
The type system is the system of 15 , extended with a rule for protect. Its rules are given in Figure 2 . The rules allow us to prove typing judgments of the form `p : as well as subtyping judgments of the form 1 2 . Here denotes an identi er typing, which i s a nite function from identi ers to phrase types. Note that guards of conditionals may be high.
If `c : for some , then we say that c is well typed under . Also, if O i s w ell typed under for every 2 domO, then we say that O is well typed under .
Probabilistic states
Loosely speaking, our formulation of probabilistic noninterference is a sort of probabilistic lock step execution statement. Under two memories that may di er on high variables, we w ant to know that the probability that a concurrent program can reach some global conguration under one of the memories is the same as the probability that it reaches an equivalent con guration under the other.
A concurrent program is represented as a discrete Markov c hain 3 , the states of which are global con g- The program can get into at most ve di erent con gurations, and so its Markov c hain has ve states, given in Figure 3 . The stochastic matrix T for this Markov chain is given in Figure 4 . The probability of a transi- Kozen uses measures to capture the distributions of values of variables in probabilistic programs 10 . Our strategy is similar. Using the Markov chain, we can model the execution of a concurrent program deterministically as a sequence of probabilistic states.
De nition 4.1 A probabilistic state is a probability
measure on the set of global con gurations.
A probabilistic state can be represented as a row vector, whose components must sum to 1. So if T is a stochastic matrix and s is a probabilistic state, then the next probabilistic state in the sequence of such states modeling a concurrent computation is simply the vector-matrix product sT . For instance, the initial probabilistic state for the program O in our preceding example, with ve states, is 1 0 0 0 0. It indicates that the Markov c hain begins in state 1 with certainty. The next state is given by taking the product of this state with the stochastic matrix of Figure 4 , giving 0 1=2 1=2 0 0. This state indicates the Markov chain can be in states 2 and 3, each with a probability of 1=2. Multiplying this vector by T , w e get the third probabilistic state, 1=4 0 0 1=4 1=2; we can determine the complete execution in this way. The rst ve probabilistic states in the sequence are depicted in Figure 5 . The fth state, for instance, tells us that the probability that O terminates under memory l := 0 in at most four steps is 7=8. Thread pool O is an example of a concurrent program that is probabilistically total since it halts with probability 1, but is not nondeterministically total for it has an in nite computation path.
Note that although there may be in nitely many states in the Markov c hains corresponding to our programs, the probabilistic states that arise in our program executions will only assign nonzero probability to nitely many of them. This is because we begin execution in a single global con guration O;, and we only branch b y at most a factor of k at each step, where k is the number of threads in O. If we were to extend our language with a random number generator that returns an arbitrary integer with respect to some probability distribution, then we w ould have to consider probabilistic states which give nonzero probabilities to an in nite number of global con gurations.
With probabilistic states, we can now see how probability distributions can be sensitive to initial values of high variables, even for programs that have types in the system of Each thread is well typed, assuming skip has type H cmd. We give two sequences of state transitions. One begins with x equal to 0 Figure 6 and the other with x equal to 1 Figure 7 . Notice the change in distribution for the nal values of y when the initial value of the high variable x changes. For instance, the probability that y has nal value 1 when x equals 1 is 13=16, and falls to 1=2 when x equals 0. What is going on here is that the initial value of x a ects the amount o f time required to execute the conditional; this in turn a ects the likely order in which the two assignments to y are executed. Now suppose that we protect the conditional in this example. Then the conditional in e ect executes in one step, regardless of the value of x, and so the sequence of transitions for x = 0 is equivalent, state by state, to the sequence of transitions for x = 1 .
Probabilistic noninterference
Now we are ready to prove our main result. We begin with two lemmas which are proved in 17 : We will say that a probabilistic state s is well typed and protected if for every global con guration O; with sO; 0, every thread in O is well typed and protected.
Recall that, for any global con guration O;, the point mass on O;, denoted O; , is the probabilistic state that that gives probability 1 to O; and probability 0 to all other global con gurations.
Now we can show, as a corollary to the Lock Step Execution lemma, that is a congruence with respect to the stochastic matrix T on well-typed, protected point masses. 
Discussion
The need for a probabilistic view of security in nondeterministic computer systems has been understood for some time 18, 12 . Security properties models to treat probabilistic channels in nondeterministic systems have been formulated by McLean 11 and Gray 6, 7 . It is important, however, to recognize that these e orts address a di erent problem than what we consider in this paper. They consider a computer system with a number of users, classi ed as high or low, who send inputs to and receive outputs from the system. The problem is to prevent high users, who have access to high information, from communicating with low users, who should have access only to low information. What makes treating privacy in this setting especially di cult is that users need not be processes under control of the system|they may b e people, who are external to the system and who can observe the system's behavior from the outside. As a result, a high user may be able to communicate covertly by modulating system performance to encode high information that a low user in turn decodes using a real-time clock outside the system. Furthermore, because the low user is measuring real time, the modulations can depend on low-level system implementation details, such as the paging and caching behavior of the underlying hardware. This implies that it is not enough to prove privacy with respect to a high-level, abstract system semantics like the semantics of Figure 1 . To guarantee privacy, it is necessary for the system model to address all the implementation details.
In a mobile-code framework, where hosts are trusted, ensuring privacy is more tractable. A k ey assumption here is that any attempt to compromise privacy must arise from within the mobile code, which i s internal to the system. As a result, the system can control what the mobile code can do and what it can observe. For example, if mobile-code threads are not allowed to see a real-time clock, then they can measure the timing of other threads only by observing variations in thread interleavings. Hence, assuming a correct implementation of the semantics in Figure 1 , threads will not be able to detect any v ariations in the running time of a protected command, nor will they be able to detect timing variations due to low-level implementation details. Consequently, timing attacks are impossible in well-typed, protected programs in our language. For instance, Kocher describes a timing attack on RSA 9 . Basically, he argues that an attacker can discover a private key x by observing the amount of time required by several modular exponentiations y x mod n. Under our framework, the modular exponentiation would be protected, 3 which means that no useful timing information about exponentiation would be available to other threads|it would always appear to execute in exactly one step.
Other related research
Other work in secure information ow, in a parallel setting, includes that of Andrews and Reitman 1 , Melliar-Smith and Moser 13 , Focardi and Gorrieri 4, 5 , and Banatre and Bryce 2 . Melliar-Smith and Moser consider covert channels in Ada. They describe a data dependency analysis to nd places where Ada programs depend on the relative timing of operations within a system. Andrews and Reitman give a n axiomatic ow logic for treating information ow in the presence of process synchronization. They also sketch how one might treat timing channels in the logic. Banatre and Bryce give an axiomatic ow logic for CSP processes, also treating information ow arising from synchronization. None of these e orts, though, gives a satisfactory account of the security properties that they guarantee. Focardi and Gorrieri identify trace-based and bisimulation-based security properties for systems expressed in an extension of Milner's CCS, which they call the Security Process Algebra. These properties, however, are possibilistic in nature e.g. a system is SNNI 5 if the set of traces that a low observer can see of a system is possible regardless of whether highlevel actions are enabled or disabled in the system.
Conclusion
So what is the signi cance of our result? It depends on what can be observed. With respect to internal program behavior, our Probabilistic Noninterference result rules out all covert ows from high variables to low variables. But if external observation of the running program is allowed, then of course covert channels of the kind discussed in Section 6 remain possible. In this case, more elaborate security properties, like Gray's information ow security 7 , may be needed. Note, however, that the mobile code setting a ords us more control over external observations than would normally be possible. When we execute some mobile code on our machine, we can limit communication with the outside world, preventing precise observations of a program's execution time, for example.
